When crossing a danger area near a bend, if possible, look for

by MAJ Arthur N. Tulak, Collection Officer, CALL Several units rotating through JRTC have experienced the trauma of being detected at a linear danger area (LDA) and being subsequently engaged with indirect fire from an OPFOR forward observer, or making contact with dismounted OPFOR on the near, or far side, at the most inopportune moment when the element is split on either side of the LDA. When this happens, the BLUFOR unit loses the initiative and the friendly plan may be de-synchronized. A reconnaissance mission may be compromised, or an attack may fail because combat power is attrited away by the enemy before arriving at the objective.

Comments from JRTC unit Take-Home Packages indicate that units either fail to recognize danger areas as such, do not follow the steps outlined in FM 7-8 or the ARTEP 7-8 MTP, or do not implement effective TTPs for crossing the LDA. Platoons and squads often waste valuable time crossing the LDA due to lack of practice and/or the lack of commonly understood techniques standardized into unit SOPs. Time wasted crossing an LDA in an ad hoc or improvised manner is time taken away from the purpose of the operation.

FM 7-8, The Infantry Platoon and Squad, outlines 16 steps for crossing LDAs; the ARTEP 7-8 MTP gives the tasks, sub-tasks, and critical tasks for this collective task; and SH 21-76, The Ranger Handbook, lists five fundamentals for crossing danger areas.1However, TTPs are largely METT-T-dependent. This article will provide patrolling TTPs for both the Infantry Platoon and Squad that will assist the small unit leader in analyzing available courses of action when confronted by a linear danger area during patrolling operations.

First, leaders can take steps in the mission preparation phase to ensure quick, efficient, and secure action at LDAs by confirming LDA XNG SOPs in the Operations Order (OPORD), reviewing the route to identify all danger areas, and developing a plan for how the unit will cross the LDA. If the route to be taken traverses known LDAs, then leaders must develop a plan, identifying possible rally points, assigning responsibilities for security teams, planning indirect fire support (one of the five fundamentals in SH 21-76), reviewing actions on contact, and confirming signals. If time permits, the LDA XNG SOP can be included in the rehearsals that follow the OPORD, or these tasks can be assigned in the warning order, and rehearsed at the sub-unit level prior to the OPORD.2

The 16 steps outlined in FM 7-8 are amplified in greater detail as seven tasks with performance measures in the ARTEP 7-8 MTP. This article will describe Techniques within the framework of the 7 Steps from the MTP.

STEP 1 The Platoon Leader Directs the Platoon to Take Action on Encountering a Danger Area. The point man of the lead team encounters the LDA and signals "Danger Area;" the signal is relayed throughout the platoon and the platoon halts. The platoon leader will go forward to confirm the danger area, while the PSG checks rear security and moves up to the PL's location.

Confirming the danger area involves making the decision as to whether or not the unit will treat the danger area as such, or continue movement, all based on METT-T. If the danger area cannot be bypassed, as is the case with linear danger areas, he must determine: 1) the crossing site; 2) near and far-side rally points; 3) the method of crossing; and 4) positions for near-side left and right security.

TTP: A technique developed at JRTC is to provide the point elements criteria for when to stop and clear a danger area based on its characteristics and METT-T before commencing the operation. This technique saves time as the lead element is able to decide without having to halt the platoon and wait for the PL to make a decision.3

STEP 2 The Platoon Leader Directs the Lead Squad to Reconnoiter the Danger Area and Makes an Estimate Based on the Information Received. The lead squad will conduct reconnaissance on the near side to the left and right to find a suitable crossing site and identify possible left and right near-side security positions. Based on the information obtained through this reconnaissance, the platoon leader must first decide where to cross (the crossing site) as this decision will affect his subsequent decisions on the method of crossing, rally points, and near-side security positions. The crossing site should be a spot where the terrain and vegetation will conceal the unit from observation by OPFOR overlooking the LDA. Selecting the crossing point at a bend or curve in the road or trail will help to conceal the unit from OPFOR from at least one direction. If the terrain is undulating, placing the crossing point at a low point will facilitate concealment as well. The crossing point should be situated to minimize the distance between the concealment of the vegetation and terrain on both the near and far sides. Ideally, the unit will find the shortest route across the LDA between the concealment of the vegetation on both the near and far sides, minimizing the amount of time the crossing elements are vulnerable to observation and detection.

Having selected the crossing point, the platoon leader must determine the method of crossing from one of the following four methods from ARTEP 7-8 MTP:4

Line
Wedge
Small Groups
Individually

The platoon leader will consider METT-T factors such as the likelihood of detection, the time available, and the degree of risk the mission allows, when selecting the crossing method. Each method has advantages and disadvantages in the time required to execute, and the degree of risk of detection involved. The platoon leader must now select near- and far-side rally points in case the unit makes contact during the crossing.

TTP: If not already identified in the planning phase, these rally points may be the last In-Route Rally Point for the near side, and a grid location to an easily identifiable piece of terrain selected from a map reconnaissance, or one of the graphic control measures briefed in the OPORD (e.g., checkpoint) for the far side.

Based on the information obtained by the lead squad's reconnaissance, the platoon leader will select the left and right near-side security positions that will provide security and early warning to the main body during the crossing. These positions must afford good observation to the flanks so that the security elements can detect and report OPFOR in time for the main body to take action to avoid detection. The platoon sergeant will move up to the platoon leader's location after checking rear security.

The platoon leader informs the PSG and squad leaders of the situation, specifying: 1)the crossing site; 2) the method of crossing; 3) near- and far-side rally points; 4) left and right near-side security positions and; 5) the composition (who and what equipment) of the near- and far-side security elements. The composition of the near- and far-side security teams should be unit SOP to help minimize the time the unit spends near the LDA.

TTP: FM 7-8 states that the trail fire team usually comprises the near-side security teams5, each composed of two men. If this technique is the unit SOP, the PSG will bring with him the near-side security teams from the trail fire team when he moves to the PL's location.

TTP: The technique in SH 21-76 is for the lead squad to perform the tasks of left and right near-side security, placing A TM to the left and B TM to the right, with the squad then falling in at the rear of the platoon after crossing the LDA.6The advantages to the technique from SH 21-76 are: 1) squads are rotated out of the difficult task of leading the platoon through the brush and; 2) it speeds up the process of emplacing near-side security, as the lead squad already knows where the left and right near-side security positions are as a result of the reconnaissance.

Regardless of which squad provides for near-side security, platoon leaders must ensure the teams have what they need to perform the task. These teams must have communications to provide early warning, weapons systems to provide security and break contact, and observation devices to detect and target approaching enemy.

COMMUNICATIONS: In the light infantry platoon, the rifle squad has two AN/PRC-126 radios: one for the squad leader and the other for the A-TM leader. Leaders must ensure that these radios are provided to left- and right-side security teams before they move into position, or as they come forward with the Platoon Sergeant (if provided by the trail squad) in STEP 1. Air Assault (AASLT) and Airborne (ABN) Infantry squads have only one AN/PRC-126 per squad, which means that the PSG must secure another radio from the middle squad on his way forward to the PL, to ensure that both left and right near-side security teams have communications. The dismounted section of a Bradley IFV Mechanized Infantry platoon, if tasked to conduct a patrol, should task-organize its radio equipment in the preparation phase to ensure that near-side security teams will have communications.

WEAPONS: The leader should provide the security teams the appropriate weapons based on the likely threat. For example, if the enemy has fighting vehicles, the security teams should have AT-4s or the M72A2 LAW to defeat that threat if necessary. The LDA provides the enemy with a high-speed avenue of approach into the flank of the friendly unit. If an enemy detects the crossing unit at the crossing point, the security teams can engage the enemy flank and rear, and isolate the enemy at the crossing point from any trailing elements.

TTP: A technique developed at JRTC is to utilize the M60 MG crews (with borrowed communication equipment) as the left and right near-side security teams.7This technique provides maximum firepower along the most likely enemy avenues of approach.

TTP: An M203 grenade-launcher provides the security teams the capability to project HE grenades out to 350 meters if necessary.

TTP: Consider also equipping the left and right near-side security teams with M18A1 AP mines triggered with an M60 fuse ignitor, 45 seconds of time fuse, and a non-electric blasting cap to facilitate breaking contact in the event that the enemy attempts to maneuver against them.

OBSERVATION: The near-side security teams need to be able to detect an approaching OPFOR element, and to scan for OPFOR who might be surveilling the LDA. The teams need to observe the friendly unit as it crosses the LDA and to the flanks;8accordingly, one man looks "in" while the other looks "out." Keep the security teams small to maintain stealth.

TTP: To facilitate the teams in this task, issue them the PL's, SL's, or PSG's binoculars during daylight crossings, and ensure they have NODs at night.

STEP 3 The Platoon Leader Selects the Far-side Clearing Method Based on Observable Terrain. Available methods include the "zig-zag" and the "heart-shaped" methods, or the far-side clearing team may clear the far side by movement in its tactical wedge formation. Having the element clear through movement in its tactical formation is the fastest method, while the zig zag and the heart-shaped are more deliberate. The platoon leader readies the far-side clearing team on the near side and awaits emplacement of the near-side security teams.

STEP 4 Near-side Security Provides Security. After the PL has informed the key leaders of the situation, the PSG supervises the emplacement of the near-side security teams, while squad leaders inform their Team Leaders (TLs). The far-side security squad receives a five-point contingency plan from the PL and awaits the PL's signal to move across the crossing point to the far-side, once the near-side security teams are in place.

TTP: If using the lead squad as near-side security, ensure that the compass and pace men in the lead two squads exchange pace and azimuth data before sending the far-side security team across the LDA.9

STEP 5 The Far-Side Team Reconnoiters the Far Side. When directed, the far-side security team crosses the LDA and clears the far side using the method determined by the PL. The far-side team reconnoiters the far side and ensures that any terrain (small hills, folds, streambeds) that might conceal enemy position is clear of the enemy. If the far side team makes contact, the near-side teams (which are providing overwatch) can facilitate breaking contact by providing suppressive fires. The far-side team will establish an OP at the forward edge of the cleared area.

TTP: SH 21-76 directs the far-side clearing team to conduct a Stop, Look, Listen, and Smell (SLLS) halt, prior to establishing the OP to ensure the area is secure. The OP must be far enough on the far side to accept the entire platoon in its tactical movement formation. If the OP is too close to the LDA, individual and team/squad dispersion suffers, lowering the platoon's security posture. The OP must have radio communications with the PL to render a report if contact is made.

After establishing the OP, the far-side clearing team TL will issue a 5-point contingency plan to the OP personnel, and move back to the crossing point to signal the PL. This signal is visual and should be an SOP for the platoon (use FM communication only as a backup).

TTP: For visual signals at night, consider using the ir light source of the AN/PVS-710or the beam of a AN/PAQ-4 pointed at the center of the LDA. A sequences of flashes of a red-lens flashlight, or even the light of a wristwatch will also suffice -- just ensure that the signal is determined before the far-side security team crosses the LDA. For signalling in daylight, hand and arm signals, a "thumbs-up," works fine.

STEP 6 The Platoon Crosses the LDA. The methods listed in the ARTEP 7-8 MTP are: 1) Line (all at once); 2) Wedge; 3) Small Groups; and 4) Individually. Although there are several methods, the method offering the best balance between control, risk, and time required is crossing by small groups, that is, fire teams, which ensures that every element crossing the LDA has a leader in control. The PSG controls the crossing site, counts personnel accross, maintains communications with the near-side security teams, and controls the flow across the LDA.

TTP: During low-light conditions, it is important to show each team exactly where to go on the far side, so elements do not get separated.

TTP: To prevent a break in contact on the far side, ensure that each element waits on the far side for the first man of the following element, before moving forward to link up with the leading element. Using this method, every team that crosses will be met by someone who can direct them where to go.

The first element to cross will be the SL of the lead squad and his trailing team. On the far side, the SL will link up with the TL of the far-side clearing team and receive instructions on where to go. The SL will ensure that this information is passed to the next element to cross, which is the PLT HQ. This process is repeated with the next squad in movement and the PSG's element until only the near-side security teams remain on the near side.

STEP 7 The Platoon Continues the Mission. The platoon resumes its tactical movement formation on the far side and continues movement at the direction of the PL who is in contact with the PSG. The PSG directs the near-side security teams to cross the LDA (remember that both teams have radio communi-cations).

TTP: SH 21-76 states that the near-side security elements can cross the LDA directly from their positions on the left and right on the near side. This technique saves time in that the teams can visually make contact with each other as they cross the LDA and link up on the far side.

TTP: Another technique is to have the near-side security teams link up at the crossing point on the near side and cross at the same spot used by the rest of the platoon. The advantage to this technique is that the signature (tracks) is controlled, but the disadvantage is the time spent linking up on the near side.

TTP: Whether the overwatching near-side security teams cross at their locations, or at the main crossing point, all tracks should be sterilized (i.e., "erased").

TTP: The PSG should have a visual signal to recall the near-side security teams in case radio communications fail. Once on the far side, the squad leader reorganizes his squad for movement as the trail squad. The PSG sends up the report that everyone is across, and the platoon continues the operation.

___________________

1 See FM 7-8, The Infantry Platoon and Squad, HQDA, 22 April 1992, pp. 2-48 to 2-49; ARTEP 7-8 MTP, Mission Training Plan, Infantry Platoon and Squad, HQDA, 29 September 1994; Task No. 7-3/4-1135, pp. 5-78 to 5-80, and SH 21-76, Ranger Handbook, U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA, July 1992, p. 4-19.

2Observer-Controller comments from unit Take-Home Packages document that a lack of LDA XNG rehearsals contributed to units and subunits being compromised and engaged at LDAs. One O/C wrote that the "Key to successful danger area crossings is rehearsals . . ."

3JRTC SG OPSGRP, Take-Home Package 915 DOC 01, p. 265 of 446, on the CALL Data Base.

4 ARTEP 7-8 MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, op cit., p. 5-79.

5FM 7-8, The Infantry Platoon and Squad, op cit., p. 2-48.

6SH 21-76, Ranger Handbook, op cit., p. 4-20.

7JRTC 93-04, Take-Home Package 930218-930301, p. 31 of 594, from CALL Data Base.

8"Near side provides security . . . observes to the flanks, overwatches the crossing of the far-side security team." See ARTEP 7-8 MTP, op cit., p. 5-79.

9See SH 21-76, Ranger Handbook, op cit., p. 4-20.

10See JRTC SG OPSGRP, Take-Home Package 924, DOC 01, p. 235 of 262 on the CALL Data Base.

Table of Contents

Foreword

Section I: Patrolling TTP for Crossing Linear Danger Areas, Part 2

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